

the emperor George elevates his deputies, such as the patriarch Sergius, to his level. The portrayal of Heraclius as an emperor aided by God vindicates his bloodiest deeds. W. suggests there are responses to criticism of Heraclius in the poems, reflecting the emperor's unpopularity in Constantinople and resentment at his absences.

Claudia Rapp studies the relationship between panegyric and hagiography in terms of subject matter rather than genre. She finds fluidity of definition of secular power and sacral authority in the fourth and fifth centuries. Moses is shown to be prototype of the ideal bishop and paradigm for the Christian emperor.

Theresa Urbainczyk examines Socrates and Sozomen's treatment of Theodosius II, Constantine, John Chrysostom, and Julian. Unsurprisingly, she finds the two have different perspectives: Sozomen puts Church and bishop in a more positive light; Socrates is ambivalent about John and easier on Julian.

Michael Whitby explores anew the way in which Evagrius constructs his formal judgements of patriarchs and emperors, arguing that his portraits are not cardboard clichés, as they have been characterized. W. both identifies the qualities Evagrius valued and tests the latter's verdicts against external evidence.

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FINDING THINGS OUT

W.-R. MANN: *The Discovery of Things: Aristotle's Categories and their Context*. Pp. xii + 231. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Cased, £24.95. ISBN: 0-691-01020-X.

This intelligent and engaging book advances an apparently outrageous thesis: 'before the *Categories* and *Topics*, there were no things' (p. 4). For Aristotle's *Categories* 'presents a revolutionary metaphysical picture' (p. 3). The picture charmed observers; and if it did not 'come to be common sense immediately', it is now 'firmly in place' (p. 201 with n. 18). The artist, on the other hand, was dissatisfied, and in the *Metaphysics* he painted a new ontological landscape (p. 206). Thus Everyman's understanding of the world depends on a brief Aristotelian whim.

The outrageous thesis is not what it seems: M. demurely explains that 'the discovery of things amounts to the discovery of objects, to the discovery that all the entities need to be divided into particular objects on the one hand, and whatever belongs to those objects on the other. . . . To this Aristotle adds the further claim that the objects, the bona fide things, are the most fundamental entities' (pp. 10–11). It is not that Aristotle discovered cabbages and kings; rather, he was the first philosopher to recognize that this king and that cabbage are particular items (rather than universals) and are objects (rather than properties). And he was also the first philosopher to insist that any other items there may be—the divine right of kings or the divine colour of savoys—are dependent entities, their existence being parasitical upon the existence of particular objects.

These novel ideas were not drawn from the void; for 'the characteristic concerns and claims of <Cat.> can be seen to be the outgrowth of Aristotle's critical engagement with earlier Greek philosophy' (p. 5)—and in particular, with Plato. We fail to see this inasmuch as 'crucial parts of Plato's metaphysical picture have been misunderstood'; for we have been blind to 'the at first startling idea that there are no things in his ontology, that Plato does not recognize things as things' (p. 6).

Thus half the book is about Plato, half about *Cat*.

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As for Plato, we must cease to think of ‘the participants as particular objects, and the Forms as general features’ (p. 18). Plato distinguishes between τὰ γιγνόμενα and τὰ ὄντα. But this ‘metaphysical contrast is not between *unchanging* things and *changing* ones, but between *unchangeable* ones and *changeable* ones, between stable and unstable items’ (p. 29). Or rather, ‘it is not the case that ordinary things have the nature to be subject to change, in every way; rather, because ordinary things lack natures, they are subject to change, in every way’ (p. 83). The crucial part of the Platonic picture is ‘the metaphysical distinction between things that have a nature and those that do not’ (p. 171). My walnut trees have no natures: now and then they manifest nut-producing behaviour, they take on the rôle of nut-producers, they are caught in the act of producing nuts, but they are not nut-producers. In general, they manifest F-like behaviour of many sorts but they are never F.

Not all of this is as startling as M. implies. One of its heterodoxies—the notion that trees have no natures—is elusively vague; and another—the sense of ‘τὰ γιγνόμενα’—is supported by a contestable essay on Greek usage of the verb ‘γίγνεσθαι’. And a niggling question insinuates itself: if Plato meant to say what M. says he meant to say, then why did he not say it?

However that may be, the participants are dependent items inasmuch as they are named ‘eponymously’ after the Forms in which they participate. A passage in the *Laws* (895B–E) ‘strongly suggests that Aristotle is presupposing familiarity with the Academy’s discussions of the issues he goes on to treat in (the early chapters of) the *Categories*, and that the treatise should accordingly be seen as his contribution to those discussions’ (p. 43 n. 15). Thus it was with Plato in mind (p. 56) that, in *Cat.* 1, Aristotle developed his account of ‘the four kinds of eponymy’—synonymy, homonymy, paronymy, and heteronymy (pp. 48–9). Heteronymy, which *Cat.* 4 omits to catalogue, is of little importance. Homonymy ‘is a degenerate case of paronymy’ (p. 192). So ‘the primary contrast with which Aristotle is working is not . . . the one between homonymy and synonymy, but rather the one between paronymy and synonymy’ (p. 193). My walnuts are called trees synonymously—and so, *pace* Plato, they have natures.

The notion of being named ‘after [ἀπό]’ something is the heart of eponymy. Aristotle uses ‘ἀπό’ to characterize paronymy (*Cat.* 1a11–15; 6b12–14; 10a32–b9; *Top.* 111a33–b4); the preposition occasionally indicates non-paronymous relations (e.g. *Cat.* 10a27–9; b10–11; cf. *Top.* 111b4–5); and at *Cat.* 3a33–4 and b7–9 Aristotle speaks of items being called synonymously ἀπό something. But neither Aristotle nor any of his ancient commentators speaks of ‘the four eponymies’; and the link with Plato which M. postulates is not evident in the texts.

In *Cat.* 2 Aristotle distinguishes between being ‘said of a subject’ and being ‘in a subject’. Innocent of the distinction, Plato implicitly held that nothing is said of my walnuts as subjects (p. 191). Aristotle contends that innumerable things are so said of them and hence that they are, *pace* Plato, genuine things. As M. notes, Aristotle’s distinction is infected by several acute diseases—a reason, perhaps, for being wary of the suggestion that, in *Cat.*, Aristotle is merely articulating an ‘ontology of common sense’.

M. grounds the distinction on a bipartite linguistic test. Suppose that y is predicated of x by way of the sentence ‘S is P’. Then y is said of x as a subject if and only if both (a) the definition of ‘P’ applies to x and also (b) there is no abstract noun which designates y (pp. 192–3) Part (b) has no direct textual support. Part (a) is found at *Cat.* 1b10–15 and 2a19–34; but it is not without its problems. Suppose that Socrates is pale and a man: are the definitions of the two predicates true of Socrates? Aristotle

answers that the definition of 'man' is true of Socrates but the definition of 'pallor' is not. But his asymmetrical answer depends on an asymmetrical identification of the predicates. Pair 'man' with 'pale' and 'pallor' with 'humanity': then there is a symmetrical answer, the definitions of 'man' and of 'pale' being true of Socrates and the definitions of 'pallor' and of 'humanity' not.

M. packs far more into his short book than this review can mention. He has hatched a rare bird: an essay which takes a tired topic and proves both original and exhilarating.

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DIALOGUE AND PERPLEXITY

J. J. CLEARY, G. M. GURTLE (edd.): *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XIII, 1997*. Pp. xviii + 291. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 1999. Cased, \$71. ISBN: 90-04-11394-0.

'Working to prepare this commentary I have learned both from his paper and because of his paper as I returned to familiar passages with a fresh set of insights and questions.'

This quotation from W. Wians's comment on R. Bolton's paper 'Aristotle on Essence and Necessity' neatly expresses the value of a publication such as this, in which each colloquium consists of a main paper, a comment, and a joint bibliography. Such a format is probably the best refutation that can be made of Plato's assertion that a book cannot answer back! And it is with Plato that most of the colloquia are concerned. One exception is that on Aristotle, already mentioned, in which Wians takes issue with Bolton's 'highly original' interpretation of A.'s account of 'scientific knowledge', an interpretation in which he seeks 'a single type of necessity that applies to all principles without involving essences' and argues, against widely held scholarly positions, 'that *A Po I* 4–6 focus on scientific conclusions rather than premises'.

The other exception is the colloquium on Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, which features here not because the Proceedings have inadvertently strayed into the field of literary criticism, but because, J. Moravcsik suggests, dramatists present in action themes about which philosophers theorize. He interprets the play as 'centering around the development, destruction and rebuilding—on a deeper level—of a friendship', a view that is challenged by D. Konstan, who points rather to pity and honesty as the major determinants in Neoptolemus' behaviour.

Three main themes emerge from the colloquia on Plato. G. B. Mathews traces 'The Career of Perplexity in Plato', suggesting that P.'s views on the 'aporetic' method of philosophy and his consequent portrayal of Socrates' rôle in the dialogues developed over time to the point where S. is given the honourable rôle of midwife to philosophical truths (as in the *Theaetetus*) and is finally pensioned off (my phrase) in favour of discussion of specific perplexities that can be (re)solved.

In his paper 'Plato's Statesman and Politics' J. M. Cooper contends that the argument which the Visitor uses to establish the thesis that the expertise of the ideal statesman is to be identified with that of the ideal king is so flagrantly invalid' that in reality 'the king is assimilated to the statesman, not the other way about'. In his commentary P. Mitis strongly rebuts the view that Plato is thereby acknowledging that